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4ABSTRACT
China and India are definitely on a higher economic growth path,
although the contribution of technology to economic growth is still not
very clearly estimated. There is evidence to show that innovative
activities in the industrial sector in both the countries have shown some
significant increases during the post reform process. Knowledge content
of both domestic output and exports are increasing in both the countries.
The Chinese NSI is dominated by the SSI of the electronics and
telecommunications industries and in the case of India it is led by the
SSI of the pharmaceutical industry. In both the countries, increasingly
much of the innovative activities are contributed by MNCs. In other
words both China and India have become important locations for
innovative activities. There is even some macro evidence to show that
the productivity of R&D investments in India is higher than in China,
although this proposition requires careful empirical scrutiny before firm
conclusions can be reached. However continued rise in innovative
activity is limited by the availability finance and of good quality
scientists and engineers. Although the available supply appears to be
very productive, its important that to sustain this on a long term basis
and also to spread the innovation culture to other areas of the industrial
establishment concerted efforts will have to be made to increase both
the quantity and quality of scientific manpower. Fortunately the
governments in both the countries are aware of this problem and have
started initiating a number of steps towards easing the supply of
technically trained personnel. But the governments still have to rethink
its financial support schemes by reducing as much as possible the
distortions that are currently in this area.
Key words:  India, innovation, R&D, patents, total factor productivity
growth, high-tech industry, financing of innovation, HRST,
R&D personnel.
JEL Classification: O31; O32; O34
5Introduction
China and India are two of the fastest growing economies of the
world. Their continued surge in economic growth both before and after
the recent (2008) global financial crisis has further lent credence to the
hypothesis that the economic growth registered by the two countries is
sustainable as it is based more on technological improvements rather
than by using more factor inputs such as labour and capital. Recent
estimates of total factor productivity growth lend some empirical support
to this hypothesis. Both the countries have also been receiving sizeable
chunks of FDI in R&D by MNCs. There are also press reports of a number
of innovations emanating from the two countries although systematic
empirical evidence on this issue is found wanting in the literature1.  One
of the avowed objectives of economic reforms in both the countries
(embracing of market socialism in China since 1979 and economic
liberalization in India since 1991) was to promote competition between
firms. Along with the possibility of increased competition, one also sees
that both the countries have become increasingly integrated with the
rest of the world although on these counts China has a better record than
that of India. All these factors may pave the way for both the economies
1 For a detailed count of these see, Business Week, http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/toc/05_34/B3948 chinaindia.htm
(accessed April 5 2010)
6to invest in innovative activities as the firms in both the countries are no
longer concerned with competition in their respective domestic
economies, but internationally as well. In the context, the purpose of
the present chapter is to compare the two economies with respect to
their innovation record since the onset of the reforms in the two countries
which, as argued, earlier should have facilitated this process to flourish.
The chapter is structured into four sections. The first section maps
out the larger context in which this study is conducted. The second
section marshals a fair amount of quantitative evidence on whether the
two economies are becoming innovative. The third section identifies
some disquieting features that may act as an impediment to the process
in the two countries. The fourth and final section concludes the arguments
presented in the chapter.
I. The context
In this I present the larger context against which one may analyse
the nature and extent of innovative activities in these two fast growing
economies in the world. The context has four components: (i) China
and India are the fastest growing economies in terms of efficiency of
resource use; (ii) There has been considerable improvement in China
and India’s rank summary measures of global innovation; (iii) There has
been a perceptible increase in the knowledge-intensity of China and
India’s manufactured and service exports; and (iv) Both the countries
have achieved international competitiveness in high technology areas
such as astronautic technology. I now elaborate on these four areas.
 (i)   Fastest growing economies in terms of efficiency of resource
use: Productivity growth is well recognised as a measure of an economy’s
health. This is because an economy may show rapid growth by increasing
the level of investments in the key factor inputs of capital and labour.
But what is more important is the efficiency with which these factor
inputs are combined to produce an increasing level of output. Economists
7usually measure this efficiency of resource by computing a summary
measure such as total factor productivity growth (TFPG) although the
empirical measures of TFPG is subject to the quirks of methodology and
the type of data used.  Among the various empirical exercises comparing
TFPG in China and India, two of the recent and more systematic studies
are by Bosworth and Collins (2008), examines the sources of economic
growth in the two countries over the 25 year period 1978-2004 using a
simple growth accounting framework that produces estimates of the
contribution of labour, capital, education, and total factor productivity
for the three sectors of agriculture, industry, and services as well as for
the aggregate economy. Their analysis incorporates recent data revisions
in both countries and includes extensive discussion of the underlying
data series. The growth accounts, derived by the authors, show a roughly
equal division in each country between the contributions of capital
accumulation and TFP to growth in output per worker over the period of
analysis, and an acceleration of growth when the period is divided at
1993. However, the magnitude of output growth in China is roughly
double that of India at the aggregate level, and also higher in each of the
three sectors in both sub-periods. In China the post-1993 acceleration
was concentrated mostly in industry, which contributed nearly 60
percent of China’s aggregate productivity growth. In contrast, 45 percent
of the growth in India in the second sub-period came in from services.  A
second study is by Cates cited in Economist (2009)who computed the
TFPG in emerging economies over the period 1990-2008. See Figure 1
for the results of this study. According to this study, China had the
fastest annual rate of TFP growth at around 4 per cent per annum closely
followed by India at around 2.5 per cent per annum during this period.
Now the important question is to explain the determinants of this fast
productivity growth. The three determinants that Cates identify are: (i)
rate of adoption of existing and new technologies; (ii) the pace of
domestic scientific innovations; and (iii) changes in the organisation of
production. Using a composite index of technology diffusion and
8innovation, Cates finds a strong correlation between the rate of increase
in an economy’s technological progress and its productivity growth. In
other words, the study also points to an increase in the rate of innovations
in the two countries although this is not exactly probed in to in detail in
the study.
(ii) Improvements in global innovation ranking: A number of
composite indices of global innovation are available these days. One
such index is the ‘EIU Innovation Index’ by the Economist Intelligence
Unit2.  Between 2002-06 and 2004-08, China rose from 59th to 54th in
this index. This is most impressive as the prediction was that this sort of
a moving up in the ranking will occur only within five years.  One
reason for the jump is that China is making a concerted effort to build a
more innovative economy by investing heavily in R&D and education.
India, on the contrary, is advancing at a steady pace up the innovation
ranks as the number of patents granted increases and both innovation-
specific and broad environmental factors improve. From 58th in 2002-
06 it advanced to 56th in 2004-08. In 2009-13, it is forecast to reach
54th.
 2 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Innovation Index analyses the innovation
performance of 82 economies. It is based on countries’ innovation output,
as measured by the number of patents granted by the patent offices of the
US, European Union and Japan, and innovation inputs, based on the
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Business Environment Ranking (BER) model.
The Index measures the following direct innovation inputs: R&D as a
percentage of GDP, the quality of local research infrastructure, the education
of the workforce, technical skills, the quality of information and
communications technology infrastructure and broadband penetration. The
innovation environment includes political conditions, market opportunities,
policy towards free enterprise, policy towards foreign investment, foreign
trade and exchange controls, taxes, financing, the labour market and
infrastructure.
9Figure 1: Total factor productivity growth in China and India,
1990-2008
Source: Cates cited in Economist (2009)
(iii) Increasing technological intensity of exports: By applying
the UNIDO (2009) definition of high technology products to the UN
Comtrade data (according to the SITC, Rev. 3 classification system) on
manufactured exports from China and India during the period 1988-
2008, I derived the manufactured exports from China and India. This is
presented in Table 1. It shows that the high tech export intensity of both
the countries have doubled during the period under consideration.  If
one undertakes a detailed decomposition of the components of these
high technology exports then it can be seen that China is specialising
in electronics and telecommunications equipments, while in the case of
India the most important high technology manufactured product are
pharmaceutical products.
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Table 1: High-technology intensity of manufactured exports from
China and India, 1988-2008
(High technology exports as a per cent of manufactured exports)
China India
1988 7.32
1989 10.12
1990 9.17
1991 9.16
1992 20.09 6.86
1993 22.76 7.21
1994 23.91 7.50
1995 25.77 8.95
1996 30.59 10.16
1997 32.44 10.23
1998 36.19 9.15
1999 38.68 9.28
2000 39.59 9.59
2001 40.92 12.34
2002 43.71 12.17
2003 47.33 12.04
2004 48.16 11.90
2005 48.42 11.12
2006 47.65 13.41
2007 46.72 14.54
2008 44.59 16.94
Source: Computed from UN Comtrade
China has in fact become the largest exporter of
telecommunications equipments in the world: its share of the world
market has actually increased from 2.36 per cent in 1992 to about 23 per
cent in 2008. The above focus on manufactured products may actually
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underestimate the technological content of exports as far as India is
concerned as the country is now increasingly diversifying into exports
of services. Approximately 40 per cent of India’s exports is in the form of
services. Within the service exports, I denote the following four as
knowledge-intensive services, namely (i) IT services; (ii) R&D services;
(iii) Architectural, engineering and technical services; and (iv)
Communications services. The combined share of these four in India’s
services exports have increased from about 55 per cent in 1999-2000 to
about 80 per cent in 2007-08.
A mere increase in the technology content of exports and
especially manufacturing does not necessarily mean that the country is
becoming innovative if this increased exports are merely based on
imported components and if the country in question does not have a
clear record with respect to objective definitions of innovative activity
in these products. It may well be the case that the country is merely
importing components and parts, assembling them and exporting the
finished product with very little local value addition.
(iv) International competitiveness in certain high technology
areas such as astronautic technology: Both China and India have an
active space research programme, spends considerable amount of public
funds on space research and have increasingly demonstrated
technological capability in designing satellites and satellite launch
vehicles and even undertaking commercial launches of satellites on
behalf of other countries. In order to measure the external
competitiveness of the astronautic sector of China and India among
other space-faring nations,   I rely on the space competitiveness index
(SCI) computed by Futron Corporation (2009). The SCI evaluates the
space faring nations across 40 individual metrics that represent the
underlying economic determinants of space competitiveness. These
metrics assess national space competitiveness in three major dimensions:
government, human capital, and industry. The ranks obtained by the ten
major space faring nations are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: India’s rank in the Space Competitiveness Index in 2008
and 2009
Rank Country Govern- Human Industry 2009 2008
ment Capital Score  Score
(Rank)
1 U.S 38.42 13.96 37.94 90.33 91.43(1)
2 Europe 19.32 9.03 18.46 46.80 48.07(2)
3 Russia 18.57 3.04 10.83 32.44 34.06(3)
4 Japan 15.80 1.72 3.65 21.16 14.46(7)
5 China 12.42 2.98 4.06 19.46 17.88(4)
6 Canada 12.89 3.42 1.82 18.13 16.94(6)
7 India 12.24 1.71 1.39 15.34 17.51(5)
8 South Korea 8.39 1.34 2.31 12.03 8.88(8)
9 Israel 6.72 0.56 1.42 8.70 8.37(9)
10 Brazil 6.10 0.49 0.50 7.08 4.96(10)
Source: Futron Corporation (2009)
India was ranked 5 in 2008. Her rank has since slipped to 7 out of
10, although her score is better than Brazil- a country that is very strong
in the aeronautical sector.
Thus, on all these four broad indicators of innovation outcomes,
both China and India show considerable improvements over time.
However, these indicators although suggestive, do not really prove that
the two countries are becoming innovative. In order to measure the
innovative activity, following Mani (2009), I rely on two of the
conventional indicators that economists continue to employ to measure
a country’s record with respect to innovations. This exercise is the theme
of the next section.
II. Evidence on innovative activity in China and India: Of the
two indicators that economists usually employ to measure innovation,
one is an input indicator, namely R&D expenditures and the second is
13
an output indicator, namely the number of patents granted.
Notwithstanding the limitations of these indicators, these are the only
ones that are available for both the countries for sufficiently long periods
of time. Further the definitions of both the indicators are standard across
the two countries.
(i)  R&D Expenditure:  In order to compare the Gross
Expenditure on R&D (GERD) of the two countries, I have converted
the GERD in national currencies to US Dollars. Apart from the absolute
levels of GERD, I also present the GERD intensities. These are presented
in Table 3.
Table 3: Investments in overall R&D in China and India, 1995-2006
(absolute values of GERD are in billions of US $ and relative values are GERD to
GDP ratios in percentages)
GERD GERD Ratio of GERD/ GERD/GDP
China  India China to GDP China  India
India
1995 4.22 2.04 2.07 0.57 0.72
1996 4.89 2.11 2.31 0.57 0.69
1997 6.15 2.45 2.51 0.64 0.71
1998 6.66 2.57 2.59 0.65 0.76
1999 8.21 2.90 2.83 0.76 0.77
2000 10.83 3.20 3.38 0.90 0.81
2001 12.60 3.43 3.67 0.95 0.84
2002 15.57 3.51 4.44 1.07 0.81
2003 18.62 3.86 4.82 1.13 0.80
2004 23.77 4.35 5.46 1.23 0.78
2005 29.63 4.91 6.04 1.33 0.75
2006 37.03 6.35 5.83 1.42 0.88
Source: Chinese data are from OECD (2008); and Indian data are from
Department of Science and Technology (2009)
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In both absolute and relative terms China’s GERD has increased
tremendously during the period under consideration. For instance, it
has increased at an annual average rate of 22 per cent during the period
compared to India’s growth rare of 11 per cent. Second, China’s research
intensity has virtually trebled during this period, while India’s has more
or less remained constant. Finally, China used to spend two times that of
India towards the beginning of the period but this has increased to
almost six times now.  This better performance of China in terms of R&D
investments may be attributable to the country having a more clearly
articulated innovation policy with clear targets on R&D investments
coupled with institutional changes and instruments to achieve those set
targets within the stipulated time horizon. For instance,   the Chinese
government has set as a goal to increase R&D intensity to 2% of GDP by
2010 and 2.5% by 2020 (OECD, 2008, 111). India too had a target of
research intensity reaching 2 per cent by 2006-073, but in actuality it is
woefully short of this target. Care has to be exercised while interpreting
these figures to mean that the overall relative investments in R&D in
India have actually declined. This is because of certain peculiarities
with respect to India’s R&D performance. See Table 4 for a sector-wide
distribution of R&D in the two countries. Even now, in India the
government accounts for over 63 per cent of the total R&D performed
within the country although the share of government has tended to
come down over time. This has been accompanied by an increase in
R&D investments by business enterprises which now account for about
30 per cent- a significant increase from just 14 per cent in 1991. For
China the similar percentage is about 71 per cent by business enterprises
and research institutes (read government) account for only 19 per cent:
China has actually gone through an elaborate process of paring down
the role of governmental research institutes in the performance of R&D
by converting a large number of these institutes into business enterprises.
3 See Government of India, 2003, http://www.india.gov.in/outerwin.
php?id=http://dst.gov.in (accessed April 9 2010)
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As a result, the number of government research institutes (GRIs) in China
reduced significantly from 5867 in 1991 to about 1149 GRIs in 20044.
Increase in the share of R&D performed by business enterprises is
generally considered to be a desirable trend as business enterprises tends
to implement or productionise the results of their research rather quickly
than the government sector where much of the research does not fructify
into products and process for the country as a whole5.
Table 4: Evolution of the Chinese and Indian National Systems of
Innovation, 1991-2007
(Sector-wide performances of GERD, Figures are percentage share of each sector
in total GERD)
Government Business Enterprises Higher Education
China India China India China India
1991 51.6 86.16 39.8 13.84 8.6
1996 44.9 78.26 43.2 21.74 11.8
2000 31.2 77.21 60.3 18.46 8.6 4.33
2007 19.2 67.91 72.3 27.71 8.5 4.38
Source: OECD (2008) and Department of Science and Technology (2009)
The business enterprise sector in both the countries is now emerging
as the core of the NSI in both the countries although it is much more
pronounced in the case of China than in India. In China, the business
sector has become the largest R&D performer in terms of S&T inputs and
outputs. According to these indicators, the business sector plays a dominant
role in the S&T development of China. However, due to various historical
and structural reasons, the efficiency and the innovation capacity of the
4 For detailed account of this see Gu and Lundavall (2006) and Schaaper
(2009)
5 Governmental R&D in India is expended by atomic energy, defense, space,
health and agricultural sectors. The spillover of government research to
civilian use is very much limited in the Indian context although in more
recent times conscious efforts have been made by the government is slowly
beginning to produce results. This especially so in the area of astronautic
research. For details see Mani (2010 b).
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business sector is still insufficient, despite a large and rapid increase in
scale and scope. While S&T activities in government research institutes
and the higher education sector have some similarities, the business sector
is different from the previous two sectors in several aspects.
The R&D expenditure of the business enterprise sector of both
the countries have risen, once again, the  Chinese annual growth rate at
31 per cent is much higher than that is recorded for India and as a result
the R&D expenditure of Chinese enterprises is almost 16 times its
counterparts in India  (Table 5).  It must however be noted that both
Chinese and Indian firms spent only less than a per cent of their sales
turn over on R&D.
It looks as if the business enterprises in both China and India are
becoming the core of both country’s NSI. However, OECD (2008) remarks
that “it would be wrong to conclude that firms already form the backbone
of the Chinese NIS. To a significant extent, the rapid increase in business
sector R&D has resulted mechanically from the conversion of some
public research institutes into business entities often without creating
the conditions for them to become innovation oriented firms’’.
Table 5: Business enterprise R&D expenditures in both China and
India, 1999-2006    (Values are in billions of US $)
China Growth India Growth Ratio of
 rate (%) rate (%)  China to
India
1999 4.07 0.61 6.64
2000 6.49 59 0.59 -3.59 10.98
2001 7.62 17 0.62 4.75 12.30
2002 9.53 25 0.68 9.36 14.06
2003 11.61 22 0.75 10.85 15.46
2004 15.89 37 0.99 31.38 16.10
2005 20.24 27 1.37 38.79 14.78
2006 26.33 30 1.64 19.92 16.03
Source: OECD (2008) and Department of Science and Technology (2009)
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If both Chinese and Indian business enterprises have increased
their investments in intramural R&D, it will also be interesting to see the
relationship between these investments and the costs incurred in
importing technology from abroad. Combining the two aspects, I define
a ratio called the average propensity to adapt. This is defined as the ratio
of intramural R&D in business enterprises to cost incurred in technology
purchases from abroad (Figure 2). If this ratio is greater than unity, it
could be argued that under cetris paribus conditions, firms are
developing local technological capabilities.
From the above, it could be seen that Indian business enterprises
despite their lower levels of investments in R&D have a better propensity
to adapt and thereby develop local capabilities compared to their
Chinese counterparts. Although it must be said that both Chinese and
Figure 2:  Average propensity to adapt in Chinese and Indian business
enterprises, 1991-2002
Source:  Computed from OECD (2008) and Department of Science and
Technology (2009)
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Indian companies are increasingly improving their propensity to adapt.
The exercise is admittedly very limited in terms of its scope. Further
studies of a case study nature are very much required before one can
draw strong conclusions or inferences of this type.
R&D outsourcing: Another interesting aspect of R&D in business
enterprises is the fact that both China and India have become important
recipients of R&D outsourcing deals. R&D offshoring started in India
way back in 1984 with Texas Instruments setting up its first R&D centre
in Bangalore. China’s R&D offshoring trend began in the early 1990s
with Motorola being the first company to take advantage of the local
talent and low cost in China. No precise estimates of the size of this
sector in both the countries exist. According to some private estimates6
that are available there exist 920 MNCs having 1,100 R&D centres in
China. The number till December 2008 for India was about 671 MNCs
with 781 R&D centers. Data on receipts under R&D services are lacking
in the case of China, but in the case of India it has increased from US $
221 million in 2004-05 to US $ 1385 million in 2008-09 (Reserve Bank
of India, 2010, p. 580). Availability of high quality scientists and
engineers and the lower costs of performing R&D are identified as the
main reasons for the growth of these R&D outsourcing. Most of these
R&D outsourcing is actually confined to certain high technology
industries such as telecommunications equipment, information
technology, pharmaceuticals and biotech industries. Available studies
in the case of China (Lan and Liang, 2006) has shown that foreign R&D
centres are hardly connected with the national system of innovation of
China as their linkages are often enough with their own parent firms
abroad. This is likely to be the same for India as well.
Industry-wide distribution: In both the countries, R&D by
business enterprises is concentrated in about ten industries (Table 6)
although the degree of concentration is slightly higher in India. Another
6  http://zinnov.com/blog/?p=160 (accessed on April 6 2010)
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interesting issue brought out by the table is the fact that China appears
to specialize in the creation of electronics and telecommunications
technologies while in the case of India it is the pharmaceutical
technologies. In fact both the countries have become very important
world players in these two industries. In other words, based on this data,
it may not be incorrect to state that the NSI of the two countries are to a
certain extent dominated and shaped by the Sectoral System of
Innovation (SSI) of the two industries, electronics and
telecommunications in the case of China and pharmaceutical in the
case of India. However, there is one manufacturing industry where both
the countries are concentrating on, namely the transport equipment
industry. This is also an industry where a number of high profile new
product launches by domestic manufacturers have occurred7.
Productivity of R&D: It is seen that China invests far greater
amounts on R&D compared to that of India.
Table 7: Productivity of R&D investments: China vs India, 1995-2006
(GERD is in US $ Billions, Patents granted are in numbers; Productivity
is US $ billion per patent granted)
GERD GERD Patents Patents China India Ratio of
China  India  China  India  Produc-  Produc-  China to
tivity tivity  India
1995 4.22 2.04 62 37 0.07 0.06 1.233
1996 4.89 2.11 46 35 0.11 0.06 1.760
1997 6.15 2.45 62 47 0.10 0.05 1.901
1998 6.66 2.57 72 85 0.09 0.03 3.059
1999 8.21 2.90 90 112 0.09 0.03 3.527
2000 10.83 3.20 119 131 0.09 0.02 3.723
2001 12.60 3.43 195 178 0.06 0.02 3.350
2002 15.57 3.51 289 249 0.05 0.01 3.828
2003 18.62 3.86 297 342 0.06 0.01 5.549
2004 23.77 4.35 404 363 0.06 0.01 4.907
2005 29.63 4.91 402 384 0.07 0.01 5.767
2006 37.03 6.35 661 481 0.06 0.01 4.245
Source: Table 3 and USPTO
7 For instance the launch of the small car, TATA Nano in the case of India.
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So it will be instructive to analyse the productivity differential in
R&D investments in the two countries. Admittedly, this is a complex
issue to be tackled. Nevertheless a first attempt is made in terms of
relating R&D investments in the two countries to their respective output
in terms of patents granted. However there are different types of patents,
national, foreign and Triadic. Further there are utility and design patents:
utility patents are for new inventions where design patents are for
ornamental changes in existing products.  Given the fact that both
national and Triadic patents are very specific and depend on the norms
adopted individual patents, following the usual practice in the literature,
I analyse the US utility patenting behaviour of Chinese and Indian
inventors. These are then related to the GERD in both the countries to
arrive at the amount of GERD per US utility patent (Table 7). The
resulting exercise point to two important results: firstly, China’s
productivity has virtually remained constant over the years while India’s
productivity show a definite increase over time and secondly,  the
productivity differential between the two countries have actually
increased over time with India’s productivity being more than the
Chinese one.  However, given the rudimentary nature of this exercise,
one has to be very careful in drawing strong conclusions about the
productivity differential between the two giants, especially when the
earlier results on TFP presents a better picture for China.    Needless to
add this is an important issue that needs a further empirical probe at
much disaggregated levels.
So based on this analysis of R&D expenditures it is somewhat
clear that Chinese electronics and telecommunications sectors and the
Indian pharmaceutical sectors have become more innovative since the
onset of reforms. I propose to follow this argument through with an
analysis of the patenting behaviour of the two countries.
(ii) Patenting behaviour: R&D investment is basically an input
measure of innovation while patents are an output measure. There are
22
three different types of patents, namely patenting by Chinese and Indian
inventors in the US, Triadic patents and national patents in both China
and India. I examine the record of the two countries in each of these. I
begin with the US patenting record of the two countries as for reasons
seen above are one of the most important indicators about innovative
activity.   Both the countries have improved their US patenting record
since the onset of reforms (Table 8), again China having more patents
than India. In fact the difference between the two countries record with
respect to patenting has increased over time. But there is an important
difference between the two countries. India has, relatively speaking,
more utility patents (defined as those for new inventions).  Increasingly
most of the Chinese patents are design patents accounting for as much
as one third of the total patents. Finally both China and India together
account for much of the patents that inventors from the BRICs have
secured in the USA.
Technology-wide distribution of these patents (Table 9) also shows
some important differences between the two countries although at the
very same time it supports the finding that the analysis of R&D
expenditure had indicated (in Table 6 above). Two important differences
are discernible. Firstly, Chinese inventors have focused more on
developing electrical, electronic and telecommunications technologies
while Indian inventors have been focusing much more on pharmaceutical
and chemical technologies. Secondly, Indian inventors are, relatively
speaking, more specialized (as the country has a much higher
concentration on fewer technologies) than their Chinese counterparts.
Finally of the top fifteen classes of technologies emphasized by Chinese
and Indian inventors there are only three classes in which both the
countries have common interest. These are in pharmaceuticals (Class
424), telecommunications (Class 370) and software (class 707). Of these
three in the former, India has a lead while in the latter two classes both
the countries have the same level of patents.
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A still another important issue is of the ownership of these patents.
See Table 10. Although there are some differences between the two
countries, there are some important common points. In both countries
much of the US patents are held by foreign companies, their level being
much higher in China due essentially to the larger number of foreign
companies in the two countries. Domestic enterprises in both the
countries have similar levels of patenting. There, however are two
important differences: firstly, Indian Govern Research Institutes (GRI’s)
and universities (actually almost entirely GRIs) have a higher share
than their Chinese counterparts and secondly Chinese individuals have
a higher patenting record than Indian individuals. The higher share of
Indian GRI’s is due to two reasons. Firstly, the CSIR network of
laboratories had an explicit strategy of increasing their patent portfolio
and this strategy was set into motion since the late 1990s although this
does appear to be tapering off since 2003 (Mani, 2009). Secondly, I had
noted earlier that Chinese NSI had gone through a massive reorganisation
although the 1990s wherein a number of hitherto GRIs were converted
to business enterprises.   The exercise thus shows that increasingly the
surge in US patenting by both China and India are largely contributed by
foreign R&D centres which are operating from the two countries and as
such the surge in patents need not necessarily imply that the two countries
are becoming more innovative.   Rather, the more correct inference may
be that the two countries have indeed become important locations for
innovative activities. The business press is replete with a large number of
innovations that MNCs were able to carry out from the countries.
Table 10:  Ownership of US Patents, Cumulative 1963-2008
   (percentage shares)
China India
Foreign 53.56 40.26
Individually Owned Patents 27.96 9.95
Domestic business enterprises 13.21 14.14
GRIs and Universities 5.28 35.67
Total 100 100
Source: Computed from USPTO
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I continue the analysis with Triadic patents from China and India.
These patents being taken for the same family of technologies from
three different patent offices (namely, the US, European and Japanese)
signify a very high level of quality as it is more difficult and costly not
just to secure these patents but also to maintain them8. Consequently
firms and research institutes will in all probability self select their best
inventions to patent. So an increase in the number of Triadic patents
secured indicates not just your ability to innovate but also the quality
of it. See Table 11.
Table 11: Triadic patents granted to Chinese and Indian Inventors,
1990-2006
        (Number of Triadic patents)
Brazil Russian China India South World
Federation Africa
1990 10 21 12 12 13 32417
1991 6 36 12 8 18 29786
1992 13 45 17 7 33 29922
1993 22 34 16 8 32 30794
1994 12 51 17 6 21 32414
1995 17 60 21 11 25 35731
1996 18 58 23 14 29 39098
1997 29 69 43 22 34 41515
1998 29 94 47 34 35 42878
1999 31 60 62 40 31 45507
2000 33 69 84 45 35 47162
2001 47 56 114 85 24 45565
2002 44 48 178 106 28 46120
2003 51 51 252 120 30 48093
2004 51 55 290 122 33 50727
2005 56 64 384 133 31 50569
2006 65 63 484 136 30 51579
Growth
rate (%) 18.77 10.38 27.86 20.98 8.39 3.04
Source: OECD (2009)
8 Triadic patent families are defined at the OECD as a set of patents taken at
the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO), and
granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), to protect the
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China and India has the highest growth rate and also accounts for
the largest share among the BRICS.
National Patents: In both the countries there has been a
tremendous surge in national patents. See Table 12. But in both the
countries most of the national patenting is still dominated by foreign
inventors although the share of domestic inventors has been showing
some fluctuations. Of the two, the share of domestic inventors is higher
in China and in the case of India although the share of domestic inventors
kept on rising (with some fluctuations) until 2005, it has started declining
since that year. My hypothesis is that with the TRIPS compliance of
Indian patent regime since January 1 2005, MNCs have shown a rush to
patenting in India so that Indian companies and especially the
pharmaceutical ones may find it difficult to do incremental innovations.
III. Disquieting features:  Although Chinese and Indian business
enterprises have increased their investments in R&D, the surge in
patenting that has occurred since the initiation of reforms is largely
attributable to foreign enterprises that are located in the two countries.
Domestic enterprises in the two countries, barring notable exceptions
are not innovative. Based on our review of the relevant literature and
discussions with industry associations, there are two disquieting features
or constraints that the NSI of the two countries suffer from, although it
may be argued that the intensity of these two as constraints may vary
across the two countries. The two constraints are: (i) availability and
quality of scientists and engineers of the type that can innovate; and (ii)
financing of innovative activity. Of the two, there is now some evidence
of the former issue as a constraint in both the countries, while the latter
one is a typical constraint more in the case of India.
same invention. In terms of statistical analysis, indicators on triadic patent
families improve the international comparability of patent-based statistics
(no ¯home advantage ). Furthermore, patents that belong to the family are
typically of higher value (as regards additional costs and delays involved in
extending protection to other countries).
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Availability and quality of scientists and engineers: Although it
is generally held that both China and India have a copious supply of
scientists and engineers, the fact is that  the real supply of scientists and
engineers engaged in R&D and innovative activities is not much. For
instance, in the case of China,  OECD (2008) estimates that even if the
current high levels of growth in the number of researchers is maintained
there will be a large gap between the demand  for, and supply of, scientific
manpower. The OECD (2008, p, 329) argument runs as follows: “the
Chinese government aims to raise R&D intensity from 1.34% of GDP
(2005) to 2% in 2010 and 2.5% in 2020. Despite the rapid growth of
researchers in recent years and the expansion of the tertiary education
sector, future needs may not be met. To project the future need for
researchers, a simple estimate was made, based on the following
assumptions: GDP growth at 8% on average until 2020, ratio of R&D
intensity to GDP of 2.5% in 2020, and the wage level and the proportion
of labour costs in total R&D expenditure equal to that of Korea in 2005.
The result of the simple estimation suggests that raising China’s R&D
intensity to 2.5% of GDP may imply that the need for 3.7 million
researchers by 2020, i.e. an additional 2.6 million researchers from the
number in 2005. To meet this demand means an additional 170 000
researchers each year, or average annual growth of 8.3%. From 1998 to
2005 the average annual increase in researchers was 90 457. Therefore,
even if the current level of growth in the absolute number of researchers
is maintained, there will be a large gap. The average growth rate of
researchers was 12.7% a year from 1998 to 2005; this is likely to be
difficult to sustain in the future, as the number of researchers increases.
However, for this reason, the gap in the supply of additional researchers
is expected to be more accurate from 2010".
Similar is the case in India too. The recent growth performance of
knowledge-intensive industries in India is prompting many
commentators to feel that India is transforming itself into a knowledge-
based economy. The copious supply of technically trained human
resource is considered to be one of the most important reasons for this
growth performance. However, of late, the industry has been complaining
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of serious shortages in technically trained manpower. For instance a
study conducted by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce
and Industry (FICCI, 2007) has revealed that the rapid growth in the
globally integrated Indian economy has led to a huge demand for skilled
human resources. However, lack of quality in the higher education sector
has become a hindrance in filling the gap. The survey, based on a study
conducted in 25 sectors, also showed that currently there is a shortage of
about 25 per cent skilled manpower in the engineering sector.
In order to see the present supply of scientists and engineers for
R&D, I introduce three concepts of human resource in science and
engineering9: Human Resource in Science and Technology (HRST),
R&D personnel, and Researchers. These are then estimated for both
China and India. I estimate both the total and density as well (Table 13).
Table 13: Stock of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in China
and India
(Full time equivalent basis as of 2005)
HRST R&D
personnel Researchers
Total 70.34 1.36 1.18
China ( million numbers)
Density 914.98 17.69 15.35
 (per 10, 000 labour force)
Total 40.20 0.39 0.15
India  ( million numbers)
Density 933.49 9.06 3.48
(per 10, 000 labour force)
Source:  Computed from OECD (2008), Department of Science and
Technology (2009), and National Council of Applied Economic
Research (2005).
9 The definition of HRST is broad and covers “people actually or potentially
employed in occupations requiring at least a first university degree’’ in
S&T, which includes all fields of science, technology and engineering.
R&D personnel, as defined by the OECD Frascati Manual (2002), are “all
persons employed directly on R&D”, which includes those providing direct
services such as R&D managers, administrators and clerical staff. The Frascati
Manual defines researchers as “professionals engaged in the conception or
creation of new knowledge, products, processes, methods and systems and
in the management of the projects concerned”.
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 On both the total number and on density as well, the numbers are
far less than what one finds for other developed countries including that
of Korea an erstwhile developing country now having joined the club
of developed countries.
Two issues have an impact on the potential supply of scientists
and engineers for especially domestic business enterprises. The first is
an issue that has been in existence for a long time, namely the migration
of high skilled personnel from China and India to the west. There is
every indication that this flow has increased in recent times. The second
one is the growing FDI in R&D in both the countries. Foreign R&D
centres are able to offer better incentives, both pecuniary and otherwise
to domestic researchers and R&D personnel than domestic business
enterprises. As a result the small stock of scientists and engineers may
get attracted to the foreign R&D centers and a ‘crowding out’ of sorts
may take place. Lan and Liang (2006) has already noted this for China
and my own discussions (although not based on a statistically random
sample) with domestic research-oriented firms have indicated this
possibility.
Apart from this supply, doubts also have been expressed about
the quality of science and engineering workforce in both the countries
although the quality is often difficult to measure in an objective manner.
Fortunately the governments in both China and India are very
much aware of this constraint and over the last few years have instituted
a large number of programmes to increase both the supply of science
and technology personnel in the two countries and to improve its quality
as well. China, especially has put in place many schemes to even reverse
the “brain drain” from the country although India is depending much
more on market means to reverse high skilled migration from the country.
Financing of innovation:   Studies done across the world and
especially the innovation surveys have time and again brought to the
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fore the importance for financing innovations as this is an area which is
characterised by severe market failures. I discuss this constraint in the
context of the two countries.
According to OCED (2007) some important constraints on China’s
financial system affect innovative activity in the business enterprise
sector:
• China’s financial system does not meet the funding needs of
private firms, notably SMEs. The capital market is
underdeveloped and SMEs find it difficult to secure loans since
banks favour large companies, particularly SOEs. Smaller,
privately owned firms thus largely depend on self-funding. Recent
initiatives to address this issue propose funding mechanisms to
support science and technology and innovation activities; and
• There is a severe lack of capital for financing new ventures, which
are one important source of innovation. China lacks both the
expertise and the necessary legal and regulatory conditions for
an adequately functioning venture capital system. Domestic
venture capital firms have been set up by the government, at
national or provincial level, and are run by government officials
who do not always have adequate technical, commercial or
managerial skills.
India has two types of financial schemes for financing innovations:
first, research grants and loans at concessional rates of interest and second,
tax incentives for committing resources to R&D. First,  recent analysis
by Mani (2010 a) showed that much if not all of the small number of
research grants and loans available for financing innovations (such as
those by the Technology Development Board etc) are directed largely
at the public sector although, as we have just demonstrated that, much
of the innovations actually emanate from private sector enterprises. In
short, there is a mismatch in the financing of innovations in the sense
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that research grants and concessional loans are not directed towards
those sectors which are active in innovations. Second, the country has a
tax incentive scheme for encouraging more investments in R&D. These
incentives have been correctly fine tuned to encourage innovations in
ten high and medium technology-based industries which are at the same
time active in innovative activity. Mani (2010 a) endeavoured to estimate
the coefficient of elasticity of R&D with respect to tax foregone as result
of this incentive scheme   The elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect
to tax foregone as a result of the operation of the R&D tax incentive is
less than unity for all the relevant industries, although it is significant
only in the case of the chemicals industry. In two of the industries,
namely in automotive and electronic industries the elasticity is even
negative, although not significant. From this, the reasonable
interpretation that is possible is that tax incentive does not have any
influence on R&D, excepting possibly in the chemicals industry where
it has some influence although even in this case the change in R&D as
a result of tax incentive is less than the amount of tax foregone. This
lack of significant relationship between R&D and tax foregone can be
rationalized by the fact that the tax subsidy covers only a very small
percentage share (on an average 6 per cent) of R&D undertaken by the
enterprises in the four broad industry groups. So our conclusion is that
for tax incentive to be effective in raising R&D expenditures it must
form a significant portion of R&D investments by an enterprise. It is not
thus a determinant of R&D investments by enterprises for the present.
IV.   Conclusions
China and India are definitely on a higher economic growth path,
although the contribution of technology to economic growth is still not
very clearly estimated. There is evidence to show that innovative
activities in the industrial sector in both the countries have shown some
significant increases during the post reform process. Knowledge content
of both domestic output and exports are increasing in both the countries.
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The Chinese NSI is dominated by the SSI of the electronics and
telecommunications industries and in the case of India it is led by the
SSI of the pharmaceutical industry. In both the countries, increasingly
much of the innovative activities are contributed by MNCs. In other
words, both China and India have become important locations for
innovative activities. There is even some macro evidence to show that
the productivity of R&D investments in India is higher than in China,
although this proposition requires careful empirical scrutiny before firm
conclusions can be reached. However, continued rise in innovative
activity is limited by the availability finance and of good quality
scientists and engineers. Although the available supply appears to be
very productive, its important that to sustain this on a long term basis
and also to spread the innovation culture to other areas of the industrial
establishment concerted efforts will have to be made to increase both
the quantity and quality of scientific manpower. Fortunately the
governments in both the countries are aware of this problem and have
started initiating a number of steps towards easing the supply of
technically trained personnel. But the governments still have to rethink
its financial support schemes by reducing as much as possible the
distortions that are currently in this area.
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